

Smart Contract Security Audit

Questos

Jul 25th, 2021



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# **Summary**

This report has been made for **Questos** to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of the smart contract. Automatic code Analysis has been performed as well as a manual code review.

The audit process has given special attention to:

- Check the code against attack vectors.
- Ensure compliance with current industry standards.
- Ensure contract logic meets the specifications of the project.
- Compare the contract to other contract implementations industry leaders.

This security report resulted in different types of findings from medium to info. We recommend addressing the findings, if possible, to ensure a high security level and industry best practices.



# **Overview**

# **Project Summary**

Project name: Questos

**Description:** Questos is carbon negative blockchain. Our project

absorbs more harmful CO2 than it causes.

Plattform: BSC

Language: Solidity

Codebase: Questos.sol

# **Audit Summary**

**Date:** 2021/07/24

Plattform: Binance Smart Chain

Audit Methodology: Automated Tests, Manual Review, Testnet Deployment

**Key Components:** Questos.sol



# **Contract Summary**

**Total Supply:** 1.000.000.000

Decimals: 18

Platform: Binance Smart Chain

**Compiler version:** v0.6.12+commit.27d51765

Symbol: xQTX

Name: Questos - Green Blockchain

# **Vulnerability Summary**

Total Issues	14	
Critical	0	
Major	0	
Medium	3	
Minor	8	
Info	3	



# **Audit Scope**

File	SHA256
Questos.sol	5fc7583cd4c3bbc5eb437b312e40bf675af431cf0a5ca56697ad48292fcc0651



## **Contract Overview**

# **Contract Description**

The Questos Protocol is a decentralized finance token deployed on the Binance Smart Chain (BSC) network. Questos uses two advanced features in its protocol. Static rewards for the holders of Questos Token and an automated liquidity function.

The static reward (reflection) is implemented through a 5% transfer fee and is distributed to all token holders.

The automated liquidity function (auto LP) is implemented through a 5% transfer fee and is added to the PancakeSwapv2 liquidity pool.

Additionally, there is a 1% charity, advertising and development fee that will be send to an extra wallet. There is a 1% Burn fee.

#### **Contract Functions**

## **Privileged Functions**

The contract includes the following privileged functions, which are restricted by the "only0wner" modifier and used to change the contract specifications and address attributes.

Change in the scheme's liquidation, tax and maximum transaction percentages:

- function setTaxFeePercent(uint taxFee)
- function setMaxTxPercent(uint maxTxPercent)
- function setMaxTxPercent(uint maxTxPercent)
- function enableAllFees()
- function disableAllFee()



Account management functions for the reward system:


- function excludeFromReward(address account)
- function includeInReward(address account)
- function excludeFromFee(address account)
- function includeInFee(address account)

Function to toggle the auto LP mechanism:

function setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled(bool \_enabled)



# **Findings**



# **Summary**

No	Туре	Description
#Sec-01	Minor	private _tTotal
#Sec-02	Minor	private _decimals
#Sec-03	Minor	private _name
#Sec-04	Minor	private _symbol
#Sec-05	Minor	private numTokensSellToAddToLiquidity
#Sec-06	Minor	Wrong error message in code
#Sec-07	Medium	Contract gains BNB that is not withdrawable
#Sec-08	Info	Return value not handled



#Sec-09	Info	Naming is not matching the operating environment
#Sec-10	Minor	3rd party dependencies
#Sec-11	Minor	Privileged owners
#Sec-12	Info	Typos in the contract
#Sec-13	Medium	Possible to gain ownership after renouncing
#Sec-14	Medium	Centralized risk in addLiquidity



# **#Sec-01:** private \_tTotal

Type: Minor

uint256 private \_tTotal = 1000000000 \* 10 \*\* 9;

## **Description**

Variable private \_tTotal can be declared as constant since the variable is never changed.

#### Recommendation



# **#Sec-02:** private \_decimals

Type: Minor

uint8 private \_decimals = 9;

# **Description**

Variable private \_decimals can be declared as constant since the variable is never changed.

#### Recommendation



# #Sec-03: private \_name

Type: Minor

st<u>r</u>ing private \_name = "NinjaDoge";

# **Description**

Variable private \_name can be declared as constant since the variable is never changed.

#### Recommendation



# **#Sec-04: private \_symbol**

Type: Minor

string private \_symbol = "NINJADOGE";

## **Description**

Variable <a href="private">private</a> <a href="symbol">\_symbol</a> can be declared as <a href="constant">constant</a> since the variable is never changed.

## Recommendation



# **#Sec-05: private numTokensSellToAddToLiquidity**

Type: Minor

uint256 private numTokensSellToAddToLiquidity = 500000 \* 10 \*\* 9;

# **Description**

Variable private numTokensSellToAddToLiquidity can be declared as constant since the variable is never changed.

#### Recommendation



# **#Sec-06: Wrong error message in Code**

Type: Minor

```
function includeInReward(address account) external onlyOwner() {
    require(_isExcluded[account], "Account is already excluded");
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < _excluded.length; i++) {
        if (_excluded[i] == account) {
            _excluded[i] = _excluded.length - 1];
            _tOwned[account] = 0;
            _isExcluded[account] = false;
            _excluded.pop();
        break;
    }
}</pre>
```

## **Description**

In the function includeInReward the message "Account is already excluded" is does not describe the error correctly.

#### Recommendation

The message "Account is already excluded" should be changed to "Account not excluded".



# **#Sec-07: Contract gains BNB that is not withdrawable**

Type: Medium

```
function swapAndLiquify(uint256 contractTokenBalance) private lockTheSwap {
    // split the contract balance into halves
    uint256 half = contractTokenBalance.div(2);
    uint256 otherHalf = contractTokenBalance.sub(half);

// capture the contract's current ETH balance.
    // this is so that we can capture exactly the amount of ETH that the
    // swap creates, and not make the liquidity event include any ETH that
    // has been manually sent to the contract
    uint256 initialBalance = address(this).balance;

// swap tokens for ETH
    swapTokensForEth(half);
    // <- this breaks the ETH -> HATE swap when swap+liquify is triggered

// how much ETH did we just swap into?
    uint256 newBalance = address(this).balance.sub(initialBalance);

// add liquidity to uniswap
    addLiquidity(otherHalf, newBalance);
emit SwapAndLiquify(half, newBalance, otherHalf);
}
```

## **Description**

The function swapAndLiquify 50% of the contractTokenBalance Questos tokens into BNB. The other half of the Questos tokens and part of the converted BNB are paid into the Questos BNB pancake swap liquidity pool.

Each time the function swapAndLiquify is called, a small amount of BNB remains in the contract, because the Questos price drops a bit after the first half of Questos tokens are swapped to BNB and the other half of Questos need less than the converted BNB to be paired with it when liquidity is added. The contract does not have a way to withdraw these BNB. They will be locked into the contract forever.

#### Recommendation

This is not ideal that more and more BNB gets locked into the contract over time.

One solution could be to add a function into the contract that can withdraw the BNB.



# #Sec-08: Return value not handled

Type: Info

```
// add the liquidity
uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH{value : ethAmount}(
    address(this),
    tokenAmount,
    0, // slippage is unavoidable
    0, // slippage is unavoidable
    owner(),
    block.timestamp
);
```

# **Description**

The functions return value is not properly handled.

#### Recommendation

We recommend using variables to receive the return value.



# **#Sec-09: Naming is not matching the operating environment**

Type: Info

```
interface IUniswapV2Factory {

interface IUniswapV2Pair {

interface IUniswapV2Router01 {

    IUniswapV2Router02 public uniswapV2Router;
    address public uniswapV2Pair;

function swapTokensForEth(uint256 tokenAmount) private {
    // gapapata_the_uniswap_pain_path_of_token_ap_weth_
```

#### **Description**

The Questos Contract uses the Binance Smart Chain network and PancakeSwapv2. In the contract the naming is Uniswap and ETH.

#### Recommendation

We recommend changing "Uniswap" and "ETH" to "Pancakeswap" and "BNB".



# #Sec-10: 3<sup>rd</sup> party dependency

Type: Minor

## **Description**

The Questos Contract depends on the PancakeSwap protocols. This audits scope was only the Questos contract. We assume that 3<sup>rd</sup> party dependencies function correctly. However, there is always a very small risk that 3<sup>rd</sup> party dependencies can be compromised or changed.

#### Recommendation

The interaction with PancakeSwap protocols is needed in the logic of the auto liquidity function of the Questos protocol. Therefore, we recommend the Questos team to monitor the 3<sup>rd</sup> party dependencies and deactivate the auto liquidity feature when unexpected activities are observed at the 3<sup>rd</sup> party side.



# **#Sec-11: Ownership privileged**

Type: Minor

# **Description**

The Questos Contract Owner has the permission to:

- I. change taxFee, liqidityFee, \_maxTxAmount and setCharityWallet
- II. exclude and include addresses from rewards.
- III. Enable and disable auto LP function.
- IV. Change the LP token receive address.

#### Recommendation

Renounce ownership or time lock the ownership.



# **#Sec-12: Ownership privileged**

Type: Info

## **Description**

```
event SwapAndLiquify(
    uint256 tokensSwapped,
    uint256 ethReceived,
    uint256 tokensIntoLiqudity
);
```

tokensIntoLiqudity should be named to tokensIntoLiquidity.

```
//to recieve ETH from uniswapV2Router when swaping
receive() external payable {}
```

recieve should be receive and swaping should be swapping.

#### Recommendation

We recommend correcting the typos.



# **#Sec-13: Possible to gain ownership after renouncing**

Type: **Medium** 

## **Description**

It is possible for an owner to gain ownership after call of the renounceOwnership function. This can be done by performing following actions:

- 1. Call lock. ( previousOwner will be set to current owner.)
- 2. Call unlock.
- 3. Call renounceOwnership.
- 4. Call unlock to get ownership again.

#### Recommendation

We recommend to remove unlock and lock functions or change the code in the renounceOwnership function to set previousOwner to 0 address.



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The Dexmon team only audited the smart contract by their best knowing at with the technology at the time the report was made.



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